One of the annoying things about the blogospheric conspiracy-mongering about Dick Cheney’s accidental shooting of Harry Whittington is that every inconsistency is being treated as an intentional lie or evidence of a cover-up. Some of the post-hoc spin was surely designed to mislead — as in Katharine Armstrong’s initial denial that there had been any alcohol on the hunt — but some of the inconsistencies also can, I think, be attributed to the fact that people make errors all the time for no reason at all except their human capacity for confusion.
For example:
* Whittington, in his brief remarks after being released from the hospital, described himself as having been shot on Friday, not Saturday.
* The police report describing Whittington’s injuries includes a drawing showing the injuries on the left side of his body, even though the accompanying written report describes them as being on the right side — which is where they in fact were.
So the police officer investigating the incident couldn’t tell left from right, and the man who was shot couldn’t correctly identify what day it happened. I suspect there were many other such genuine or structural errors in responding to the crisis, as well as the much-discussed judgment errors. For example, Cheney lost his chief of staff Scooter Libby, who had served him during his entire vice presidency, in late Octover 2005, after Libby was indicted. And in early February his chief spokesman and political strategist Steve Schmidt made the jump to Arnold Schwarzeneggar’s re-election campaign. Cheney, left with new chief of staff David Addington, who is reportedly even more-press averse than the vice president, made a judgement error based on some mix of his personal dislike of press attention and (probably) emotional confusion — but the real issue is that no one in the White House was in a position to over-rule him until his actions had sparked a national furor.
Indeed, a propensity toward error, disorganization, lack of leadership, and a weak chain of command have all been repeatedly documented as characteristic of the Bush administration’s response to crisis situations. The bi-partisan Congressional Hurricane Katrina report “A Failure of Initiative” slams the administration and government agencies for their “passivity.”
The thing is, good systems and strong institutions have mechanisms that catch and mitigate the impact of human errors, while weak institutions with laissez faire leaders fail to do so. Most men have weak characters and, when confronted with their errors, become defensive and angry and seek to cast blame elsewhere or lie. Strong insitutions don’t just punish errors — they catch them before they can do harm and fix them. Weak institutions always seek to punish someone (often not the actual culpable party) while failing to recognize the insitutional contribution to what went wrong — or rectify it.
Over time weak and passive leaders weaken insitutions and give human error and personal idiosyncracy unchecked room to flourish. That seems to be some of what’s been happening inside the Bush administration.